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131215L - WHAT IS PATIENT SAFETY?

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Lecture to 3rd year medical students on 15th December 2013 at the Faculty of Medicine by Prof Omar Hasan Kasule Sr. adapted from WHO Patient safety curriculum


LEARNING OBJECTIVES
·         To understand the discipline of patient safety and its role in minimizing the incidence and impact of adverse events

LEARNING OUTCOMES: KNOWLEDGE
·         The harm caused by health-care errors and system failures;
·         The lessons about error and system failure from other industries;
·         The history of patient safety and the origins of the blame culture;
·         The difference between system failures, violations and errors;
·         A model of patient safety.

LEARNING OUTCOMES: PERFORMANCE
·         Apply patient safety thinking in all clinical activities;
·         Demonstrate ability to recognize the role of patient safety in safe health-care delivery.

KEYWORDS
·         Patient’s safety, system theory, blame on culture, system failures, personal approach, violations and patient safety models.

DEFINITION OF PATIENT SAFETY
·         Patient safety is defined as a discipline in the health-care sector that applies safety science methods towards the goal of achieving a trustworthy system of health-care delivery.
·         Patient safety is also an attribute of health-care systems; it minimizes the incidence and impact of, and maximizes recovery from adverse events
·         This definition provides the scope for the conceptual model for patient safety.

WHY PATIENT SAFETY?
·         While health care has become more effective it has also become more complex, with greater use of new technologies, medicines and treatments.
·         Health services treat older and sicker patients who often present with significant co-morbidities requiring more and more difficult decisions as to health care priorities.
·         Increasing economic pressure on health systems often leads to overloaded health care environments

RELEVANCE OF PATIENT SAFETY
·         There is now overwhelming evidence that significant numbers of patients are harmed from their health care either resulting in permanent injury, increased length of stay (LOS) in hospitals and even death.
·         adverse events occur not because bad people intentionally hurt patients but rather that the system of health care fails



EXAMPLES OF SAFETY ISSUES
·         Prescribing antibiotics without regard for the patient’s underlying condition and whether antibiotics will help the patient,
·         Administering multiple drugs without attention to the potential for adverse drug reactions,
·         Poor communication between different health-care providers
·         Delays in receiving treatment.
·         Washing hands correctly
·         Being a team player.

SIMPLE APPROACHES TO SAFETY
·         Engaging with patients and their families,
·         Checking procedures
·         Learning from errors
·         Communicating effectively with the health-care team: reporting and analysing errors
·         Understanding the factors that lead to errors is essential for thinking about changes that will prevent errors from being made.

THE HARM CAUSED BY HEALTH-CARE ERRORS AND SYSTEM FAILURES
·         More than 2/3 of adverse events are preventable: 28% negligence, 42% other factors
·         Medication harm to patients 6.5/100 admissions in US teaching hospitals
·         In Australia medical errors causes 18,000 deaths in a year and more than 50,000 disabled
·         In US medical error caused 44,000-98,000 unnecessary deaths in a year
·         Other consequences of errors:  USD29b in hospitalization, litigation costs, infections acquired in hospitals, lost income, disability and medical expenses

PUBLISHED RESEARCH ON ADVERSE EVENTS (RATE%)
·         United States  (Harvard Medical Practice Study)                  1984                3.8%
·         United States (Utah–Colorado study)                                    1992                3.2%
·         United States  (Utah–Colorado study)                                   1992                5.4%
·         Australia (Quality in AustralianHealth Care Study)              1992                16.6%
·         Australia (Quality in Australian Health Care Study               1992                10.6%
·         United Kingdom Acute care hospitals                                   1999                11.7%
·         Denmark Acute care hospitals                                                1998               9.0%

SENTINEL EVENTS (MOST SERIOUS ADVERSE EVENTS in the US
·         Suicide of inpatient or within 72 hours of discharge              29%                
·         Surgery on wrong patient or body part                                   29%                
·         Medication error leading to death                                          3%                  
·         Rape/assault/homicide in an in-patient setting                        8%
·         Incompatible blood transfusion                                              6%                  
·         Maternal death (labour, delivery)                                           3%                  
·         Infant abduction/wrong family discharge                              1%
·         Retained instrument after surgery                                          1%                  
·         Unanticipated death of a full-term infant -                            N/A
·         Severe neonatal hyperbilirubinaemia -                                    N/A
·         Prolonged fluoroscopy -                                                         N/A
·         Intravascular gas embolism                                                     N/A -
N

HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF ADVERSE EVENTS…1
·         In South Australia the costs of claims and premiums on insurance for large medical negligence suits to be about AU$18 million in 1997–1998.
·         The National Health Service in the United Kingdom pays out around £400 million in settlement of clinical negligence claims every year
·         The US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) reported in December 1999 that preventing medical errors has the potential to save approximately US$ 8.8 billion per year.

HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF ADVERSE EVENTS…2
·         The Institute of Medicine report estimated that between 44 000 and 98 000 people die each year from medical errors in hospitals alone, thus making medical errors the eighth leading cause of death in the United States.
·         The Institute of Medicine estimated that preventable errors cost the nation about US$ 17 billion annually in direct and indirect costs.
·         The human costs of pain, suffering, loss of independence, loss of productivity (family and patient)


LESSONS ABOUT ERROR AND SYSTEM FAILURE FROM OTHER INDUSTRIES..1
·         The large-scale technological disasters in other industries led to development of systems and culture for safety
·         The central principle was that accidents are caused by multiple factors, not single factors in isolation: individual situational factors, workplace conditions and latent organizational and management decisions were commonly involved.
·         Analysis of these disasters also showed that the more complex the organization, the greater potential for a larger number of system errors in the organization or operation.
·         tracing the “chain of events” was critical to an understanding of the underlying causes of accidents

LESSONS ABOUT ERROR AND SYSTEM FAILURE FROM OTHER INDUSTRIES..1
·         latent human errors were more significant than technical failures. Even when faulty equipment or components were present, he observed that human action could have averted or mitigated the bad outcome.
·         In the Chernobyl catastrophe organizational errors and violations of operating procedures due to poor safety culture that tolerates violations of rules and procedures is critical.
·         Challenger crash investigation showed how violations had become the rule rather than the exception.
·         only a systems approach (as opposed to the more common “person” approach—of blaming an individual doctor or nurse) will create a safer health-care culture because it is easier to change the conditions people work in than change human actions.

HISTORY OF PATIENT SAFETY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BLAME CULTURE
·         Traditional management of failures and mistakes in health care has been called the person approach—we single out the individuals directly involved in the patient care at the time of the incident and hold them accountable: the “blame culture”.
·         We identify the person—be they medical student, nurse or doctor—who gave the wrong drug and blame him/her, ashame him, discipline him, and retrain him
·         Policies change to tell the individual how to avoid the error The focus is still on the individual staff members rather than on how the system failed to protect the patient and prevent a wrong medication being administered.

WHY DO WE BLAME?...1
·         It is human nature to want to blame someone and far more “satisfying” for everyone involved in investigating an incident if there is someone to blame.
·         Attribution theory:  The premise of this theory is that people naturally want to make sense of the world, so when unexpected events happen, we automatically start figuring out who caused it.
·         Pivotal to our need to blame is the belief that punitive action sends a strong message to others that errors are unacceptable and that those who make them will be punished.

WHY DO WE BLAME?...2
·         The problem with the blame culture is that it is predicated on a belief that the offender somehow chose to make the error rather than adopt the correct procedure: that the person intended to do the wrong thing.
·         Because individuals are trained and/or have professional/organizational status, we think that they “should have known better”
·         The prevailing cultural response to mistakes, at that time, was to punish individuals rather than address any system problems that may have contributed to the error(s).
·         Underpinning this practice was the belief that, since individuals are trained to perform tasks, then a failure of that task must relate to the failure of individual performance, thus deserving punishment.

EXPLANATION OF ERRORS
·         Human actions are almost always constrained and governed by factors beyond an individual’s immediate control.
·         People cannot easily avoid those actions that they did not intend to perform.
·         Errors have multiple causes: personal, task-related, situational and organizational factors.
·         Within a skilled, experienced and largely well intentioned workforce, situations are more amenable to improvement than people.
·         “hindsight bias”—because most people involved in serious accidents do not intend something to go wrong and generally do what seems like the “right” thing to do at the time, though they “may be blind to the consequences of their actions”
·         Organizations that place a premium on safety routinely examine all aspects of the system in the event of an accident,  including equipment design, procedures, training and other organizational features

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SYSTEM FAILURES, VIOLATIONS AND ERRORS
·         Using a systems approach to errors and failures in the system does not mean that system thinking implies a “blame-free” culture.
·         individual health professionals are required to be accountable for their actions and to maintain competence and practise ethically.
·         Part of the difficulty is that many health professionals daily break professional rules such as using proper hand washing techniques, or letting junior and inexperienced providers work without proper supervision.
·         Students may see doctors on the wards or in the clinics who cut corners and think that it is the way things are done.

TYPES OF VIOLATIONS
·         Violation is a deviation from safe operating procedures, standards or rules
·         Routine violation: Doctors who fail to wash their hands in between patients because they feel they are too busy.
·         Optimizing violation: Doctors who let a medical student perform a procedure unsupervised because they are with their private patients
·         Necessary violation: Nurses and doctors who knowingly miss out important steps in medication dispensing because of time constraints and the number of patients to be seen

A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO VIOLATIONS
·         By applying systems thinking to errors and failures, we can ensure that when such an event occurs we do not automatically rush to blame the people closest to the error—those at the so called “sharp” end of care.
·         Using a systems approach we can examine the entire system of care to find out what happened rather than who did it. Only after careful attention to the multiple factors associated with an incident can there be an assessment as to whether any one person was responsible.

MODEL OF PATIENT SAFETY: 4 MAIN DOMAINS
1. Those who work in health care;
2. Those who receive health care or have a stake in its availability;
3. The infrastructure of systems for therapeutic interventions (health-care delivery processes);
4. The methods for feedback and continuous improvement.

FEATURES OF THE SAFETY MODEL
• Understanding the system of health care;
• Recognizing that performance varies across services;
• The methods for improvement including how to implement and measure a change;
• Understanding the people who work in the system and their relationships with one another and the organization.


STUDENT APPLICATION OF PATIENT SAFETY THINKING
·         Relationships with patients: Relate and communicate with each individual
·         patient as a unique human
·         Understand the multiple factors involved in failures
·         Avoid blaming when an error occurs
·         Practice evidence-based care
·         Maintain continuity of care for patients
·         Awareness of the importance of self-care
·         Act ethically everyday