Lecture for 3rd year medical
students Faculty of Medicine King Fahad Medical City on 18th May
2013 by Professor Omar Hasan Kasule Sr.
Why is this topic important?
Students
and HCW must understand types and causes of errors to be able to prevent them
Errors
are a learning experience
Keywords:
Error,
violation, near miss, hindsight bias, root cause analysis.
Learning
objective
·
Understand the nature of error and how health
care can learn from error to improve patient safety.
Learning
outcomes: knowledge and performance
·
explain the terms error, violation, near miss, hindsight
bias.
·
know the ways to learn from errors;
·
participate in an analysis of an adverse event;
·
practice strategies to reduce errors.
Nature
of errors
·
In simple terms, an error occurs “when someone
is trying to do the right thing, but actually does the wrong thing ie a non-deliberate deviation from what was
intended.
·
Errors may occur by doing the wrong thing
(commission) or by failing to do the right thing (omission).
·
Violations are errors caused by a deliberate
deviation from an accepted protocol or standard of care.
·
A bad outcome may occur without an error. A
error may not be followed by a bad outcome
·
Medical errors are like other errors but
medical professionals are reluctant to acknowledge errors because of the
culture of ‘infallibility’
·
2 types of error: execution error or lapse
(forgetting)
Principal
error types
·
Rule-based mistake
·
Knowledge-based mistake
·
Skill-based slips
·
Attention slips
·
Lapses of memory
General
error reduction principles
·
Unfamiliarity with the task
·
Inexperience
·
Shortage of time
·
Inadequate checking
·
Poor procedures
·
Limited memory capacity
·
Fatigue
·
Stress, hunger, illness
·
Language or cultural factors
·
Hazardous attitudes
Menmonics
to remember the principles: HALT
·
H Hungry
·
A Angry
·
L Late
·
or
·
T Tired
Another mnemonic
is IM SAFE
·
I Illness
·
M Medication (prescription alcohol and others)
·
S Stress
·
A Alcohol
·
F Fatigue
·
E Emotion
Incident
reporting
·
Incident reporting and monitoring involves collecting
and analyzing information about any event
·
An incident-reporting system is a fundamental
component of an organization’s ability to learn from error.
·
Incidents are traditionally under-reported,
often because the person approach to incident analysis
·
The frequency of reporting and the manner in which
incidents are analyzed—using a systems approach rather than a person
approach—are heavily dependent on the leadership and “culture”within an
organization.
Successful
strategies in terms of incident
·
anonymous reporting;
·
timely feedback;
·
open acknowledgement of successes resulting
from incident reporting;
·
reporting of near misses is useful in that
“free lessons” can be learnt, i.e. system
·
improvements can be instituted as a result of the
investigation but at no cost to a patient.
Root
cause analysis 1
·
Root cause analysis is a tool to evaluate, analyze
and develop system improvements for the most serious adverse events [9].
·
Reporting an incident requires the following
basic information: What happened? Who was involved? When did it happen? Where
did it happen? The severity of the actual or potential harm. The likelihood of recurrence.
The consequences.
·
Root cause analysis focuses on the system and not
the individual worker and assumes that the adverse event causing harm to a
patient is a system failure.
·
The severity assessment code is used to triage
the reported incidents to ensure those indicating the most serious risk to the
organization are dealt with first.
Root
cause analysis 2
·
The root cause analysis model focuses on
prevention not blame or punishment. Other processes are used when people are
required to be accountable for their actions.
·
The focus is on systems level vulnerabilities
and not individual performance. The model examines multiple factors such as communication,
training, fatigue, scheduling,
·
rostering, environment, equipment, rules,
policies and barriers.
·
The defining characteristics of root cause
analysis include: review by an interprofessional team knowledgeable about the
processes involved in the event;analysis of systems and processes rather than
individual performance; deep analysis using “what” and “why” probes until all
aspects of the process are reviewed and contributing factors are
considered;identification of potential improvements that could be made in
systems or processes to improve performance and reduce the likelihood of such
adverse events or close calls in the future.
Some
personal error reduction strategies for students are to
·
know yourself (eat well, sleep well and look
·
after yourself):
·
know your environment;
·
know your task(s);
·
preparation and planning (What if...);
·
build checks into the routine;
·
ask if you do not know.
·
assume that errors will be made and that they should
prepare for them;
·
identify those circumstances most likely to lead
to errors;
·
have contingencies in place to cope with problems,
interruptions and distractions;
·
always mentally rehearse complex procedures or
if it is the first time you are doing an activity involving a patient.
Tips are
known to limit the potential errors
·
avoid reliance on memory;
·
simplify processes;
·
standardize common processes and procedures;
·
routinely use checklists;
·
decrease the reliance on vigilance.
Summary
·
Both individual and organizational levels through
incident reporting and analysis.
·
Barriers to learning from error include: a
blame culture that institutes a person approach to investigation and the
phenomenon of hindsight bias.
·
A broadly based system approach is required for
organizational learning and the possibility of system change to occur.
·
Root cause analysis is a highly structured
system approach to incident analysis that is generally reserved for the most
serious patient harm episodes.
CASE
STUDY #1
A
21-year-old female has died after being administered vincristine accidentally
via a spinal route in error. An inquiry is under way. Vincristine (and other
vincaalkaloids) should only be given intravenously via aminibag. Vincristine, a
widely used chemotherapeutic agent, should only be administered intravenously,
and never by any other route. Many patients receiving IV vincristine also
receive other medication via a spinal route as part of their treatment
protocol. This has led to errors where vincristine has been administered via a
spinal route. Since 1968, this error has been reported in a variety of
international settings 55 times. There have been repeated warnings over time
and extensive labeling requirements and standards. However, errors related to
the accidental administration of vincristine via a spinal route continue to
occur.
CASE
SUDY #2
A
21-year-old male was being treated for non- Hodgkin’s lymphoma. A syringe
containing vincristine for another patient had been accidentally delivered to
the patient’s bedside. A physician administered vincristine via a spinal route,
believing it was a different medication. The error was not recognized and the
patient died three days later.
CASE
STUDY #3
A
58-year-old female was being treated for non- Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Vincristine
was prepared in a 20 ml syringe and delivered in a package containing two other
drugs, including methotrexate. Route of administration was not indicated on the
solutions. The intrathecal treatment was administered at noon. The hematologist
was particularly busy and requested help from another doctor who had not recently
participated in intrathecal procedures. The medication was delivered in the
patient’s room. The nurse who assists was not familiar with the intrathecal
procedures. The 20 ml syringe with vincristine was passed to the doctor who
started to inject it. After administering approximately 2 ml, he noticed the
size of the syringe and ceased
administration
realizing the error. The patient died approximately 100 days later.
Australia,
2004
CASE
STUDY #4
A
28-year-old male with Burkitt’s lymphoma was receiving methotrexate via a
spinal route. The doctor documented that “vincristine and methotrexate [were]
given intrathecally as requested”. The warning label on the vincristine was
incomplete, and in small print, being read in a darkened room. The error was
not recognized until five days later, after paralysis of the lower limbs had
occurred. The patient died after 28 days.
CASE
STUDY #5.
As the preoperative
team briefing (team discussion before surgical procedure) was coming to an end,
a nurse spoke up and reported that “the patient has a left contact lens in his
eye”. The anesthetist asked whether it was permanent and the nurse verified
that it was disposable. The anesthetist asked the patient why the contact was
being worn, but the patient was sedated and not very coherent when he attempted
to respond. The nurse explained that the patient was unable to see without the
contact. The anesthetist explained to the operating room team that the patient
could not have the contact lens with anesthetic and that the patient should not
have been sedated with it. One of the team members asked the anesthetist if he
wanted the contact lens to be taken out and the anesthetist replied, “Well, he
cannot have anesthesia with it”. The surgical resident helped the patient
remove the contact lens from his eye. The patient asked for something to put it
in so saline was located and the contact lens was stored in a small container
of saline.